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THE IMPACT OF
CHANGING PERCEPTIONS
OF SOCIAL EQUITY ON TAX POLICY:
THE MARITAL TAX UNIT*
By

JACK

R. LONDON**

I. INTRODUCTION
This conference is dedicated to a retrospective of the fate of
a glorious and unparalleled piece of tax policy work: the Carter
Royal Commission on Taxation
In this paper, primarily by

reference to the concept of a marital tax unit, I will look at what
has happened to the recommendations made by the Commission on
the appropriate impact that the federal income tax ought to have on
women, and vice versa. In so doing, I will ignore the obvious impact
that all of the recommended reforms would have had on all
taxpayers, whatever their gender or status. I also intend to propose
a redefined tax reform agenda insofar as it relates to families, and
women in particular.
My overall theme is the impact of changing perceptions of
social equity on tax policy in the context of women and taxation.
My purpose, since I wrote so extensively on this subject in the early

O Copyright, 1988, Jack London.

**Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba.
!Canada Royal Commission on Taxation Report (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966) (Chair.
K. LeM. Carter) [hereinafter Report].
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to mid-1970s, 2 is to compare the change and growth in my own
thinking on this issue throughout the intervening period with the
actual systemic responses. Moreover, my recent experience as a
member of the Federal Tax Force on Child Care 3 has left me less
certain about relying on traditional and absolute notions of equity in
the face of the pressing political and economic needs of
disadvantaged groups, like women and children. However, to some
extent, I must say, I feel a bit uncertain about my conclusions, much
the way that sometimes I feel a certain discontinuity between my
intellectual acceptance of much feminist philosophy on the one hand
and my emotional responses, so long ago conditioned, on the other.
My thesis is fourfold. First, Carter would have treated
married persons, indeed families, as both social and economic, and
therefore taxable, units for all purposes of income determination and
income tax assessment. The Commission would have aggregated
income from all sources of both spouses and subjected it to special
rates. It also would have exempted inter-spousal property transfers
from recognition of immediate tax consequences.4 The systemic
response, to the contrary, at least on this first point, has been to
maintain the pre-Carter notion of treating spouses as unattached
individual tax units for most, though not all, purposes. But, at the
same time, there has been added to the Income Tax Act5 a long list
of circumstances in which spouses are treated as if, indeed, they
formed a marital tax unit. The result has been to exacerbate the
schizophrenic and incoherent focus of the tax system on who should
comprise the appropriate human tax units. The federal income tax
21aw Reform Commission of Canada, Tax and the Family, by J.R. London, Background
Paper (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1975); J.R. London, 'Taxation of the
Family United" in Proceedings of die 26th Ta Conference - 1974 (Toronto, Canadian Tax
Foundation, 1975) 297; J.R. London, 'Taxation of the Family: The Family as the Basic Tax
Unit" (1979) 1 Can. Tax. 4.
3
Appointed in May, 1984. Chaired by Katie Cooke. Canada, Task Force on Child Care
Report (Ottawa: Status of Women, 1986) produced and published March, 1986 [hereinafter

Cooke Report].
4Report, vol. 3, supra, note 1 at 142-49.
5R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, as amended. [Hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the Act." All
statutory references herein are to the Act unless otherwise stipulated.]
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system, more than ever before, lacks an intellectually or rationally
defensible perspective on whether married persons are, or ought to
be, considered tax units requiring aggregation of their joint incomes
from all sources. In the result, the system is less equitable, both
horizontally and vertically, than it could be, or than it would be,
under an ideal tax system, when only tax equities are considered.
Second, I would argue that the system's schizophrenia and
the inequity inherently resulting, (from the benchmark of an ideal
tax system), was properly called into question, and attacked, by
Carter in 1966. But I would further argue that changed economic
and political equities and realities have rendered aggregation of all
spousal income today, particularly earned income, impossible
politically and unacceptable when viewed from the perspective of a
number of new social equities. The most important of the new
factors follow. On the one hand, there has been a vast increase in
the participation rates of women in the work force. We also have
seen the proliferation of marital property laws that favour deferred
sharing of conjugal capital and marital assets, while concurrently
reducing the extent of the traditional obligation of post-conjugal
support owed by spouses, usually husbands.
The changes in marital property laws support the notion that
marital units, while they exist, are economic partnerships that for
tax purposes ought to lead to aggregation of marital income. The
fact that property-sharing rights generally are deferred mitigates the
weight of that conclusion but does not deny its essential validity.
Similarly, increased labour participation rates of women, and the
resulting income growth in their hands, make the decision on the
appropriate tax unit more important than ever before.
On the other hand, in the years since Carter, we have
witnessed significant increases in the divorce rate and in the
formation of what one might once have called "non-traditional"
family units: unmarried, heterosexual and homosexual. Moreover,
we have also witnessed the growth of many new and different forms
of income sharing and expenditure control patterns, even within what
once would have been called "traditional" marital and family units.
These changes argue strongly in favour of greater and more
secure forms of economic independence for women, both as of right
and in the ever more important battle to stem the feminization of
poverty. That, in turn, argues for treating women who earn income
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as independent tax units so that they may benefit from the legislated
income-splitting that occurs when the system does not aggregate
marital income.6 Even more significantly, as a society, we more
clearly, though still embryonically, recognize the rightful
independence of women from their husbands' economic control. It
is, therefore, quite impossible, now, in a self-assessing system that
depends on reasonable acceptance of its assumptions by the
population, to aggregate the income of both spouses, as one, in a
marital unit, even if it is then subjected to a special rate schedule
taking into account that two cannot live as cheaply as one on the
same gross income.
Therefore, I have changed my view. From purely the
perspective of tax equity, I would argue, the marital unit made sense
then and makes sense now, notwithstanding the evolutionary changes
earlier identified. However, emotionally and politically, it no longer
makes any sense at all, at least with regard to the aggregation of
earned income.
My third premise generalizes the second. Experience since
Carter demonstrates the fragile and temporal nature of the notion
that tax equity, in preference to efficiency and even neutrality, is, or
perhaps ought to be, the touchstone or fundamental principle of tax
policy development. The politics of tax reform, it turns out, are
equally important in all but the most fantastic, theoretical sense.
Fourth, and last, given the death of even the possibility of
aggregating the income of marital partners, I would suggest that the
tax reform agenda, as it affects women in particular, should be refocused instead on a number of important details, including in
particular:
1. Renovation of the marital status deduction7 and the reapplication of the some $1.3 billion of annual tax expenditure

6

The phenomenon of income-splitting is well-known. It occurs when lower marginal rates
of tax are applied to income. The inherent, and controversial, assumption here is that marital
income, particularly earned income, is indeed unitary, so that the individual taxation of the
spouses can be appropriately described by a term like income-splitting, which most often is
associated with more obvious tax avoidance techniques.
7

Income Tax Act, supra, note 5 at s. 109(1)(a)(ii), as indexed, by s. 117.1(1)(a).
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that it involves at the federal level8 (not to mention the quantum
of provincial tax foregone).
2. Replacement by direct grants, in the long run, of the child care
expenses deduction 9 and some $115 million of tax expenditure it
occasions e °
3. Provision, notwithstanding the inherent flaunting of pure
principles of tax equity, of major tax incentives to employers and
property developers in order to induce them to provide
community-based and workplace day care facilities, to the benefit
and relief of children and women.
4. Exemption of services, benefits, or vouchers for child care from
recognition as a benefit in the income of employees, under
certain circumstances.
5. Removal of the prohibition against the deduction of lump-sum
alimony and maintenance payments,11 in favour of a scheme of
amortized deductions.
6. Reconsideration of the attribution rules, 12 yet once again, either
to repeal them or to more fully aggregate joint marital income
from property and from the disposition of property, regardless of
the originating source of the invested funds.
I now propose to expand on each of the four parts of the
thesis, in turn.
II. TAX UNIT
The significant characteristics of the pre-Carter world were
these:

8A, of 1983.

Canada Department of Finance, Account of the Cost of Selective Tax

Measures (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1985).
9

Income Tax Act, supra, note 5 at s. 63.

10

Task Force on Child Care, Government Spending on ChildCare in Canada by C. Blain,
Background Report (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1985).
11

Supra, note 5 at ss 60(b),(c), and (c.1).

121bid. ss 74.1-74.5.
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1. Married persons
did not file joint returns; rather, they filed as
13
individuals.
2. In computing taxable income, deductions were available to an
income-earning spouse, say the husband, who supported a
spouse, say the wife, who did 4not have income exceeding a
relatively low threshold amount
3. Within that threshold amount, income earned by the wife
effectively was taxed at the husband's marginal rate because he
lost the married person's deduction as the dependent's (wife's)
income increased.
Income earned by the wife above the
threshold was taxed as though she were an individual, and at her
own rates.
4. Certain income, that is, income from property transferred from
one spouse to another, was aggregated through the mechanism
of the attribution rules; business income and property income on
investments unilaterally originating with a spouse was not
attributed.
5. The imputed income derived from household services was not
recognized.
6. Spouses could not deduct salaries 1paid
to each other, even for
6
legitimate income earning services.
7. The Minister of National Revenue had discretionary power to
reallocate the income of a spousal business partnership to one
7
or the other spouse!

13

Frank Sura v. Minister of National Revenue (1961), 62 D.T.C. 1005, [1962] C.T.C. 1

(S.C.C.).
14

Income TaxAct, supra, note 5 at s. 109(1)(a)(ii), as previously designated and amended
from time to time. The income limitation has varied over the years. Prior to the general
reforms of 1971, the provision was found in s. 26 of the Act.
15

Ibid as amended up to but not including the general amendments of 1971 [hereinafter

sometimes referred to as "the old Act].

16Ibid at ss 21(2)-(3).
17Toit at s. 21(4).
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18
8. Child care expenses were not deductible.
9. Periodic alimony and maintenance payments were deductible to
the payer, usually the husband, and were included in the income
of the recipient, usually the wife. Lump sum payments were not
recognized for income tax purposes.' 9 The restrictions on the
form of deductible payment were many and were irregularly
20
applied.
10. Gifts and bequests were subject to gift and estate tax, and
21
succession duty.
Carter, drawing on the fact that virtually every other industrialized
Western country at that time recognized the marital unit in some
way,2 2 recommended:
aggregation of marital income from all
sources, tax-free transfers of property between spouses, and
recognition of the expenses of working women through the
provisions of modest tax credits for working women with children.
The income of the marital unit would be subjected to a separate
rate schedule that would have relieved any additional tax on
marriage resulting from aggregation at low income levels. The
recommendations went further, in that a family tax unit, including
dependent children, was proposed; but that is not our subject here.
Essentially, and very simplistically, the Commission favoured
family joint filing of aggregated income for the following reasons:
1. It assumed, I would argue correctly at that time, that the family
and the individual (not to mention the corporation) were the

18

Such expenditures were considered personal and living expenses the deduction of which

was prohibited by ibid. at s. 12(1)(h), now 18(1)(h).
19

1bid at s. 11(1)(1) and 11(1)(1a) of the old Act.

20

For example, Sproston v. M.N.R, [1970] C.T.C. 131 (Exch.); Trottier v. M.N.R, [1968]
C.T.C. 324 (S.C.C.); Brown v. M.N.R, [1965] C.T.C. 302 (Exch.); and Foxcroft v. M.N.R
(1963), 3 Tax A.B.C. 415.
21

Gift tax was imposed under Part IV of the old Act. Estate tax was levied under the

federal Estate TaxAct S.C. 1958, c. 29. Succession duties were levied provincially by Ontario,
Quebec, and British Columbia.
22
See 0. Oldman & R. Temple, "Comparative Analysis of the Taxation of Married
Persons" (1960) 12 Stan. L. Rev. 585.
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predominant institutions
in our community, both in social and in
23
economic terms.
2. Absent joint filing on aggregated income, basic principles of tax
equity were offended. At the horizontal level, family units of
equal income were not taxed similarly, preference being given to
those family units with more than one earner. The more equal
the distribution of income among earners in the unit, the greater
the benefit from income-splitting. In other words, then, as now,
one-earner units were discriminated against. Vertical inequity
also results. The object of a progressive tax system, and
graduated rates, is to redistribute income appropriately from
those who have more to those who have less (the so-called
ability-to-pay principle, in the allocation of the tax burden). 24 To
do so properly requires an appropriate definition of economic
capacity in measuring income. Since married people, according
to the first point, constitute an economic unit, vertical equity
could be maintained only if the income of the married couple
was measured, through a process of aggregation, against the
income of other properly defined units.
3. Principles of tax neutrality would not be offended by aggregation
because the decision to marry, it was assumed, would not be
affected by a moderate increase in the fiscal burden on
25
marriage.
4. Tax free transfers of property between spouses and other family
members were desirable and not to be inhibited. Indeed, that
conclusion evidenced the real economic mutuality of the marital
unit and argued for aggregation. Aggregation would also
mitigate the long-acknowledged problems in the sieve-like system
of attribution rules, while reducing the frequency and
wastefulness of efforts on the part of taxpayers to avoid them.
Aggregation would dispense with the need for attribution.

23

Report, vol. 3, supra, note 1 at 123.

24For a comprehensive discussion of progressivity, see WJ. Blum & H. Kalven,
The Uneasy Casefor Progressive Taration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
25

Report, vol. 3, supra, note 1 at 123.
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5. For the first time in Canadian fiscal thought, the Commission
assumed that the costs of child care affected a unit's ability to
pay tax; that those costs were dissimilar to other personal
that they should be
consumption choices; and therefore, 26
recognized by way of modest tax credits.
In my own work, I supported aggregation and joint filing
essentially for those reasons. 27 The government of Canada did not.
In the White Paper on tax reform2s and in the legislation that
followed,29 it rejected aggregation of all income of married persons
and joint filing, though it left the door open for future
reconsideration. The rejection was founded on two bases:
1. Aggregation would lead to an unacceptable tax on marriage, in
that a husband and wife, each having an income, would together
pay more tax than two unmarried persons having the same
income. It was also noted that the effect of the marital unit
generally would be to subject the woman's income to a higher
rate of tax than it would have borne if she were single.
2. The government was unprepared then to undertake the design
of mechanisms, like separate rate schedules, that would alleviate
the burden, at least at low-income levels. Rather, it deferred
consideration to "a further installment of reform," which has
never arrived. 0
In other words, I would argue, the federal government chose
to maintain one inequity rather than another. By rejecting the
marital tax unit in 1971, the federal government continued to favour
families with one income, earned or unearned, whose after-tax
income would be less than the after-tax income of two-earner
couples of identical income. Both the woman and man in a oneearner, married couple were adversely affected. On the other hand,
261bid. at 227-29.
27

Indeed, as did Carter, I recommended a family as well as a marital unit.

28Hon. E.J. Benson, Minister of Finance, Proposalsfor Tax Reform (Ottawa:
Printer, 1969) [hereinafter White Paper].
29

Income Tax Act, supra, note 5 as am. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63.

30

white Paper, supra, note 28 at 15, s. 2.5.

Queen's
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the same policy decision ensured the further inequity that two-earner
married couples would have essentially the same after-tax income
that they would have if they were not married and cohabitating,
notwithstanding the economies of cohabitation. 31 The government's
preference was expressed in order to avoid a so-called tax on
marriage, justifiable though such a tax may have been.
In retrospect, the inarticulate premise of the government,
conscious or not, was to support and prefer, in a small way, working
women and women with capital, to women who worked in the home
or who had no capital.
That preference arguably was
understandable, given the fact that the imputed income of those
women who worked in the home was also not recognized. But then,
32
neither were any of the other forms of imputed income.
Therefore, from a perspective of pure tax equity, and given
the then general acceptance of the married couple as an economic
unit, the government's decision was wrong because it perpetuated
both the horizontal and vertical inequities earlier referred to in this
paper.
Indeed, a simple catalogue of the amendments promulgated
to the Act since Carter substantiates the conclusion that married
persons were, and are, considered, in fact, to be an economic unit;
whether one uses the test of income-pooling, sharing of benefits
received from expenditure, or saving of joint incomes. That
conclusion is somewhat less defensible, and perhaps dependent on
income level, if the test applied is whether one of the spouses,
usually the husband, typically controls the level and character of
expenditure and saving.33
Back to the catalogue; first, of those changes since 1966 that
are neutral in the debate. They include:
1. Periodic changes in the rate schedule and in the quantum of
deductions and credits, including indexing. Arguably, increases

31

Given changed social standards, it should be noted that such economies then were more
clearly associated only with couples who were legally married.
32For example, the imputed income derived from owner-occupied housing.
33

See, for example, L. Dulude, 'Taxation of the Spouses: A Comparison of Canadian,
American, British, French and Swedish Law" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ.67 at 89.
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in the amount of the marital exemption have given special
benefit to dependent spouses at home. But there has been no
change in principle, only in amount.
2. Since 1971, the recognition of gain and loss on the disposition
of property; that is, capital gains and capital losses,3 4 the
specification of the fair market value rule as the deemed
consideration in non-arm's-length transactions, 35 and deemed
realization of property immediately before death 6 In fact, the
expressed exceptions to these rules, outlined below, are the more
crucial phenomena.
The amendments to the Act in the intervening period, that
can be said to have recognized the economic individuality of spouses,
notably women, are as follows:
1. The repeal of the prohibition on the deduction of salary expense
paid by one spouse to another (or to a spouse from a
37
partnership of which the other spouse was a member.)
2. Repeal of the ministerial discretion to allocate all or part of the
income of a partnership of spouses to one or the other of the
38
spouses.
3. Substantial revision and enlargement, over the years, of the
deduction to the payer of alimony and maintenance payments,
with consequent inclusion of those amounts in the income of
recipients, generally wives. 39 Though arguably these amendments
have been neutral for purposes of the current debate, they can
be viewed as representing increased recognition of the

34

mncome Tax Act, supra, note 5 at s. 3(b).

35

1bid at s. 69.

36

1bid at s. 70.

37

Ibid at ss 74(3)-(4) repealed by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 48, s. 40(1), applicable with
respect to remuneration paid after 1979 for services rendered as an employee after 1979.
38

1bid at s. 74(5) repealed by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 48, s. 40(1), applicable to fiscal
periods ending after 11 December 1979.
39

bi

at ss 60(c.1) and 60.1.
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independence, economically and socially, of separated spouses
prior to divorce. They are therefore included in this listing.
4. Removal of attribution, in 1987, in the case of property
40
transactions between spouses at market values.
Contrasted with those changes that either have been neutral
or have at least evidenced a politically sensitive notion of the
economic independence of married persons, is a much longer list of
promulgated amendments that reiterate and re-confirm the intuitive
notion that married persons do in fact represent an economic unit
that should be recognized as having tax-paying capacity. They are
as follows:
1. Implementation of the child care expenses deduction, which not
only recognized the impact of having children on the ability of
working spouses to pay tax, but limited the availability of that
41
deduction to the lower-earning spouse.
2. A number of provisions in the system that allow for the transfer
of deductions from one spouse to another in order to maximize
their utility - for example, pension-income deductions and the
42
$1000 interest, dividend, and capital gains exemption.
3. The 1985 amendment of the attribution rules, intended to close
loopholes by aggregating income from property lent from one
spouse to another, 43 or transferred or lent to corporations
controlled by one's spouse or family members;4 4 and to prevent
reverse attribution schemes that would benefit the marital unit. 45
47
46
4. The promulgation of rollovers, both inter vivos and on death,

401bi, at s. 74.5(1).
41

1bid at s. 63.

42

For example, ibida at s. 110.3.

43

bid at ss 74.1 and 74.2.

44

1bid at s. 74.4.

451bid at s. 74.5(11).
46

1bid at s. 73.
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in the case of transfers of property between spouses. The
rollovers constitute exceptions to the general rule requiring
realization of inherent income or loss on the disposition of
property at any time, or on death,48 and the normal recognition,
at that point, of capital gains, capital losses,49 and recapture of
capital cost allowances" ° or terminal loss.51 The provisions
clearly acknowledge the marital unit.
Extension of the prohibition against the deduction of superficial
losses5 2 in situations not only where the taxpayer himself or
herself reacquires the property within the limited time period,
but in situations where his or her spouse reacquires that
53
property.
Provision for the deduction of contributions made on behalf of
a spouse to a registered retirement savings plan and certain other
deferred-income plans.54
Recognition of spouses as preferred beneficiaries, thereby
allowing for a deduction by trusts of accumulating trust income,
contrary to the general rule.55
Repeal of the federal gift tax and estate tax, and provincial
succession duty legislation, with inherent benefits to spouses,
even acknowledging the spousal rollover provisions that were
therein generally provided.
47

1bid at s. 70(6).

48

Ibid at s. 70.

49

1bid at s. 39.

50

1bid at s. 13(1).

51

bid. at s. 20(16).

52

1bid at s. 40(2)(g)(i).

53

Ibid at s. 54(i).

54

Ibid at s. 146(5.1).

55
The definition of "preferred beneficiary' is found ibid at s. 108(1)(g). The exception
to the general rule is in s. 104(12). The general rule is found in s. 104(6)(b).

300

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 26 NO. 2

9. A series of adjustments of the surrogate liability for payment of
tax by a spouse under section 160 of the Act, where property
has been transferred between spouses and on tax refunds. The
changes generally have the effect of recognizing the economic
mutuality of marital relationships and the likelihood of collusion
to avoid payment of tax.
10. The required rollover of the cumulative eligible capital of a
business proprietorship on a transfer of the business to a
spouse or to a controlled corporation, thereby denying
deduction to the unit of what otherwise would have been a
deductible loss in an arm's-length situation.56
11. Protection of the exemption of principal residences from
recognition of capital gains income after being transferred to a
spouse or a spousal trust. That is, the character of the
principal residence, while owned by 5the
transferor spouse, is
7
spouse.
transferee
the
to
over
carried
12. Allowing the deduction of moving expenses, job- or schoolrelated, including those of one's spouse and household. 58
13. The provision of a refundable child tax credit, having the
unique and progressive feature under which it begins to vanish
at joint spousal income levels above $23,500 as of 1986.59
14. As a result of amendments to the Canada Pension Plan,
effective 1 January 1987, Canada Pension Plan benefits may be
divided between spouses upon the application of either spouse.
The notion of spouses being an economic unit is recognized.
Normally, such a transfer would have resulted in attribution of
the income for income tax purposes. The 18 February 1987

56Ibid at s. 24(2).
57
58

bi, at ss 40(4)-(5).
Tbid at s. 62(3).
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budget proposed to except such payments from the attribution
rules. 60 Here, contrarily, the individual notion is recognized.

15. The introduction, in 1986, of the section 122.4 refundable tax
credit, designed to offset, for low-income earners, the concurrent

increase in federal sales tax rates effective April 1, 1986.61 The
credit vanishes at $15,000 of aggregated spousal income.
I conclude, then, on this first point, in this way. Before
Carter and after Carter, the federal income tax fundamentally
treated, and treats, married persons for tax purposes as individuals,
because it does not require joint filing of aggregated income from all
sources. From a purely tax-equity perspective, that treatment is not
defensible. It produces both vertical and horizontal inequity in the
allocation of the tax burden because of the income-splitting inherent
in individual filing.
Central to these observations are two
assumptions: first, that married persons do, in fact, represent an
economic partnership; and second, that adopting the marital unit
arbitrarily would be a reasonable compromise, a kind of shorthand,
in the otherwise inevitably impossible, but necessary, search to find
those units, married, family, or household, that actually pool and
share their incomes and whose members' incomes therefore should
62
be taxed in aggregate.
Moreover, legislative amendments since Carter have
exacerbated the patchwork of the system by focusing overwhelmingly
on the premise that marital partners are tax units.
Those
amendments have been motivated by a perceived need either to
reduce the efficacy of tax avoidance mechanisms, which split income
within the marital or family unit (itself the tip off to economic
mutuality), or to mitigate the revenue loss of various tax expenditure
programs. Indeed, even the most ardent advocates of individual
taxation usually favour measuring entitlement to social assistance
benefits, whether delivered by direct or tax expenditures, according
60

Hon. M. Wilson, Minister of Finance, Notice of Ways and Means Motion Relating to

ProposedAmendments to the Income Tax Act (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1987) at cl.
19.
61

Ibid, at s. 122.4(2).

62

The alternatives that might be considered are more fully canvassed in Tax and the

Family, supra, note 2 at 13-16.
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to aggregated spousal income levels. 63 The result, simply stated, is
an unfocused, incoherent, and irrational system.
III. TAX INEQUITY VS. POLITICAL REALITY
Having said that, and being aware of how much has not been
said, I move on to the second point. As I indicated earlier,
politically and emotionally the idea of employing the marital tax unit
as a means of aggregating spousal income from all sources is dead
and, perhaps, rightly so. Many knew that long before I did, even in
1966. Some argued that taxation of the unaggregated individual was
a matter of civil rights. 64 Others could find no satisfactory criteria
on which to decide between the various approaches.6 5 Most agreed
that the real issue was not whether one used the marital unit but
how one treated it in the scheme of progressivity. 6 6 Some simply
said, and say, that spouses are not a unit at all, though they
generally acknowledge that tax avoidance schemes involving family
members need to be stopped. 67
I have said already that the importance of the issue has been
magnified by the increase in women's labour participation rates and,
therefore, income share. Moreover, I have argued, the fact of the
economic marital partnership has been confirmed by the proliferation
of provincial marital property laws and amendments to the Income
Tax Act promulgated these last twenty years, on top of those
provisions already there in 1966 - most of which act as signposts
pointing to joint filing, as a marital unit, of aggregated income.

63

See, for example, Dulude, supra, note 33.

64R.D. Brown, "ihe Family Unit" in Proceedings of the 20th Tax Conference - 1967
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation 1967) at 109-110.
65

Blum & Kalven, supra, note 24 at 16.

66
Great Britain, Royal Commission on Taxation on Profits and Income Report, vol. 2
(London: H.M. Stationery Off., 1954) at 35.
67

For example, B.T. Bittker, "A 'Comprehensive Tax Base' as a Goal of Income Tax
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The other hand is more weighty in the result. First, there is
the growth in divorce rates, which test the stability of the institution
of marriage and hence the economic partnership notion, not to
mention its impact on the feminization of poverty. Add in the
increase in the number of non-traditional living units and the varying
patterns of fiscal management found within them, and in the more
traditional variety. Finally, there is the important, indeed crucial,
intuition that labelling women as anything but independent persons
is politically unacceptable and, more important, is harmful to the
growth and development of equal gender rights, both social and
economic. All of these argue for individual, not joint, unit status.
The equitable approach then, viewed dispassionately, and
taking only tests of equity into account, must yield, in this case, to
the new social and political paradigm. Fiscal policy that favours and
facilitates the emerging economic independence of women who earn
income is to be given primacy of place.
IV. TAX EQUITY - A FAILING PRINCIPLE OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
Which brings me to my third point. The Carter notion, on
which so many of us have depended for so long, that in the case of
a conflict of objectives, tax equity should prevail, seems to be
crumbling, if it is not already gone. I may overstate some, but not
by much.
Perhaps, once, I was simply naive. I dismissed as indefensible
the tendency of tax legislation to prefer increased yield to fair
distribution, incentive to justice, popular acceptance to correct
action, and politics to equity.
I have since learned much. For example, I have learned that
the best of policy intentions is irrelevant if it cannot easily be
translated into a relatively manageable line on the tax return. I have
also learned, and have now internalized, the lesson that whatever
one might have done in designing a system not yet in place, there
are certain pillars of a system already in place that are virtually
impossible to recast. The nonrecognition of the marital or family
unit for all purposes of tax burden allocation is just such a pillar.
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What then remains of tax equity as a decisional tool? How
would one recast the Carter philosophy so that it more realistically
may be employed?
Carter suggested four objectives for the Canadian tax system:
1. to maximize the growth of output;
2. the equitable distribution of output (which included the
subordinate concepts of taxation according to ability to pay, the
recognition of the family as a unit for tax purposes, reduced tax
burdens on those with non-discretionary expenditures, and the
avoidance of special concessions to industries or kinds of
income);
3. the protection of individual rights and liberties; and
6
4. the strengthening of federal-provincial relations. 8
Those objectives survive intact and ought to be universally
accepted, even today. However, while Carter acknowledged that
there would be conflict between those objectives and that
compromise would be situational, the Commission gave "equity"
69
primacy of place, though even it would yield in appropriate cases.
It seems to me that it is this conflict resolution principle in favour
of equity that must be recast if the family, or at least married
persons, are not to be tax units. I would argue that my own shift
in perspective, and the death of even an intrigue with the joint
return system, lead exactly to that conclusion; that is, equity will not
inevitably be the resolving principle.
The four Carter objectives more or less frame the decisional
process in matters of tax policy. When there is conflict between
objectives, equity, defined in traditional Carter terms, should
normally prevail. But, even Carter-like equity must yield in certain
circumstances. For our present purposes one of those circumstances
will be where, at least in a transitionalperiod,a disadvantaged group,
like women, seeks to equalize its bundle of social and economic
rights. Under such circumstances, pure tax equity tests must yield to
the social and economic equities of equalization. To be sure, as
Carter said, the onus clearly remains on those who would argue

68Report, vol. 2, supra, note 1 at 7, 18-19.
69
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against employing fiscal equity as the resolution principle to
demonstrate the necessity of departure therefrom. But if the onus
is met, as it seems to have been in this case, tax equity must yield,
even to the extent of discriminating against one part of the
disadvantaged group, in this case, women who form part of oneearner family units, or more precisely, marital units in which taxable
income is unequally earned by the spouses.
V. TAX REFORM
Let me then turn to my last series of points, a revised tax
reform agenda insofar as it directly and particularly affects the
taxation of women. I have suggested five agenda items, which I will
now briefly canvass in turn.
First, the marital dependency deduction, otherwise known as
the married status deduction.7" Its repeal has often been suggested,
most recently by the former Minister Responsible for the Status of
Women, 71 and by the Carter Commission and the Royal Commission
on the Status of Women before her.72 The deduction, in 1987,
amounts to $3700 for a taxpayer whose spouse earns less than $520,
above which income level it vanishes, dollar for dollar earned. If the
deduction can be defended, the defense rests on 3 grounds:
1. It arbitrarily offsets the income-splitting preference the system
now gives two-earner couples, and it reduces the relative burden
of a married couple who together have the same quantum of
income as an unattached individual, but which income must
support two rather than one. However, if one considers also the
non-inclusion of imputed household income, together with the
70
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non-deductibility of many kinds of working expenses, the
argument is substantially weakened.
2. The deduction provides the one tangible form of recognition
offered by the tax system to women at home. A matter of pride
and self-image is at stake for those who choose, or are forced,
to work in the home without market wages.
3. If increased public funding is to be provided for a public national
day care system, the marital status deduction arguably provides
a measure of fiscal balance for women (or men) who would stay
home to care for their children. The argument, of course, is
weakened substantially by the fact that the deduction is
universally accessible, whether or not there are dependent
children in the unit. Moreover, where a spouse works at home,
the unit already is the beneficiary of a large tax subsidy through
the non-inclusion of imputed income from such services.
The arguments favouring reform of the deduction, on the
other hand, are more persuasive:
1. First, the deduction, like all deductions, delivers an upside-down
benefit; greatest to those who need it least. At worst, the
deduction should be converted into a credit favouring lowerincome taxpayers.
2. It stigmatizes women who work in the home as "dependent". It
therefore has a negative labelling effect, which was the reason
the Royal Commission
on the Status of Women recommended
73
its abolition.
3. It encourages the dependency of women and provides something
of a disincentive to part-time employment, particularly for
women, since the first dollars earned are taxed, in effect, at the
husband's higher marginal rates. Since first-time labour force
entry often is on a part-time basis, the disincentive can be quite
onerous.
In my view, the deduction should be converted to a credit,
available only to those units with dependent children at home, that
vanishes as income increases. If that were done, no further
argument of policy could reasonably be heard for diverting more

73Ibid
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public funds to those who care for children at home at the expense
of badly needed funding for public child care.
I turn now to the child care expenses deduction. 74 The
current deduction is the major source of federal contribution to nonparental child care in Canada. Recently, I had occasion to review
the deduction as part of my work as a member of the Federal Tax
Force on Child Care. I will here summarize our findings, with which
75
I concur.
1. The provision of stable, good-quality, and universally accessible
and affordable child care, in the long run, will be enhanced by
public funding directed to those who supply the services. Parents
will more clearly benefit from that policy option than from an
option that would direct public funds, particularly by way of a tax
expenditure, to users. Funding users will not produce a rational,
national child care system. Therefore, in the long run, the child
care expenses deduction should be phased out, but only after
universal, quality child care services are available to all who
choose to access them. In the meantime, the current deduction
should be retained, as is, in order to bridge the time gap to a
fully funded system. But additional expenditures of public funds
will better be made, in the interim period, by direct grants to
service suppliers.
2. The deduction is popular. To a certain extent it offsets the
negative, anachronistic effects of the married status deduction;
somewhat balances the untaxed preference given non-market
household services; and is relatively neutral in terms of choice of
care format, though given its deduction limits it favours less
expensive, lower quality care.
3. On the other hand, like all deductions, it gives an upside-down
benefit; the inherent, absurd assumption being that need rises
with income. Also, because in a two-parent family the lowerearning spouse must claim the deduction, its benefit is not
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available to families without taxable income or those in which
one of the parents has little or no income, for example in a loss
year. Students are particularly disadvantaged. The support
derived from the deduction arrives after the tax year ends,
though month-to-month support normally is required. Moreover,
because much child care is provided in the grey market without
receipts, though receipts are a requirement for the deduction,
many parents cannot use the deduction. Many do not take
advantage of it simply because of the complexity and difficulty in
understanding it. In fact, our research disclosed that most
parents having children in non-parental care do not take
advantage of the deduction.
Therefore, its long-term utility is problematic. If the child
care expenses deduction were to continue to be a financing format
for child care, which is not recommended, then reform should
proceed along the lines of converting the deduction into a
refundable tax credit of much greater amount, which would reflect
the true cost of child care as an expense of earning income.
Current limits on the deduction are unreasonably low.
The Task Force recommended that a number of measures be
introduced into the tax system to provide incentives designed to
increase the supply and accessibility of public child care spaces in
Canada. The recommendations include the following:
1. All capital costs of child care facilities, incurred either by
employers on behalf of employees, or by owners of revenueproducing property, should form a new class of depreciable
property bearing a capital cost allowance rate of 100 percent,
which should not be subject to the rule that reduces the
allowance by 50 percent in the year the cost is incurred. 76
2. At the present time, it is unclear whether the provision by an
employer of free or subsidized child care services constitutes a
taxable benefit to employees under section 6 of the Act. The
Task Force, with my concurrence, has recommended that child
care benefits provided by employers to employees (whether in
the form of cash payments, facilities, or services) not be included
in employment income so long as the services provided or

76Income Tax Regulations, C.R.C. 1977, c. 945, s. 1100(2).
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purchased are licensed by a provincial authority and the benefit
is universally available to all employees, regardless of rank.77
The motivation for these tax reforms is the need to increase
the availability and supply of child care places in Canada, in order
to ease the current child care crisis. The Task Force recognized
that, in making these recommendations, notions of both horizontal
and vertical equity would be offended. For one thing, the value of
a non-taxable fringe benefit is greater to those in higher income
brackets. For another, child care fringe benefits would be treated
more favourably than other forms of fringe benefits. Lastly, we
would be using the less preferable mechanism of a tax expenditure
rather than the more accountable and efficient mechanism of a
direct expenditure grant.
However, consistent with my argument that tax equity may
no longer be necessarily the exclusive principle by which to resolve
conflicts between objectives, I would defend the Task Force
recommendations on political grounds; that is, the need to act
quickly and effectively to remedy a crisis that, to a large extent,
affects two disadvantaged groups, children and women. It is one
thing to argue in theory. It is another to deliver programs in
78
practice.
I now turn to the tax treatment of alimony and maintenance
payments. 79 As an analogue to the deduction allowed for capital
cost allowances in computing business and property income, I would
recommend allowing amortized deduction for lump sum payments
made in fulfillment of alimony and maintenance obligations. Such
payments are not be confused with transfers or divisions of marital
property under provincial deferred marital property-sharing laws.
The current tax system, which requires periodicity of payment
as a prerequisite for deduction, suffers from a serious defect: it is
not neutral. Because the income-splitting features of the deduction
are compellingly attractive, it encourages the structuring of marital
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settlements on a continuing, periodic basis. That, in turn, often
leaves women dependent for years after dissolution of cohabitation,
still at the mercy of their husband's ability or willingness to make the
payments on time, or at all. Many husbands use the tool as a
hammer.
Since, in many cases, payment can be accommodated either
on a periodic or lump-sum basis, the tax deduction is simply an
element, though a key one, in determining quantum. The tax
system, presumably with little or no revenue loss, could be amended
to make the choice of payment-format relatively tax-neutral. In
order to prevent artificial tax-avoidance planning and to ensure that
short term separation does not lead to inordinate tax benefits, the
system could, for example, provide that lump sum payments be
deductible at the straight-line rate of, say, 20 percent each year for
five years. Equal amounts would be included in the income of the
recipient. Given the current trend towards short-term "rehabilitative
maintenance,"80 the neutrality of the system, and its equity, would be
enhanced. More important, the long-term dependency of some
women would end.
Lastly, I address the need, yet once more, to amend the
attribution rules, both with regard to income earned from property
and capital income realized on the disposition of property. Two
quite distinct alternatives might plausibly be considered. On the one
hand, perhaps the attribution rules should be repealed entirely, as
was the prohibition against deducting salary expense paid to a spouse
or the spouse of a partner.81 If, in fact, married persons do not
constitute an economic and marital tax unit, and if one chooses to
encourage transfers of property ownership to spouses, notably
women (perhaps subject to a requirement that there be a truly
effective change in control), then the attribution rules are
nonsensical and problematic.
If the rules were repealed, three results are predictable.
First, the burden would be more accurately, and therefore more
equitably, focused on the legal owner of the income. Second, the
80
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current schizophrenia of the Act on unit selection would be
significantly reduced. And third, given the obvious and large benefits
to be obtained from income-splitting, significant transfers of
ownership and control of property would be effected, at least
between spouses, presumably to the benefit of women.
On the other hand, if, as I believe, the main beneficiaries of
such income-splitting arrangements are higher-bracket taxpayers,
then repeal of the attribution rules would be more regressive than
is tolerable. Here, I prefer equity to affirmative action. Therefore,
repeal, in my view, would not be progress.
Indeed, quite to the contrary, since the very object of the
attribution provisions is to prevent income-splitting, it is hard to
comprehend why the attribution provisions apply only to property
that has once been transferred or lent by one spouse to another,
or property substituted therefore. Surely the underlying rationale
and theory of such a system must be the economic and social unity
of the family or, at least for the purposes of this discussion, spouses.
The attribution rules should therefore apply to all investment income
of a marital unit and all capital income of that unit, regardless of the
original source of the investment funds. The marital tax unit may
be dead in time, but there is no reason to prevent restricting the
effects of its demise essentially to matters of earned income, while
continuing to consider unearned income for aggregation.
And so, it seems, one comes full circle. The marital, let
alone the family, tax unit is dead and rightly so. Perhaps the reason
is that circumstances and institutions have changed so significantly in
the past decade that married couples really can no longer be
assumed to be economic units with tax-paying capacity. It is more
likely, however, that, given a feminist agenda, political and social
equities have outweighed pure tax equity in the selection of the
appropriate tax unit.
But I end with the caution that the concession is not
absolute. Where, as in the case of the attribution rules, the effect
of preferring politics to tax equity would lead to an outrageous
transgression of both horizontal and vertical notions of tax equity,
the latter still should prevail.

